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I. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
A. General
The principal conclusion to be derived from a survey of the
decisions reported and the statutes adopted during the past year in
the field of administrative procedure is that sound policy necessitates
the enactment of a general, uniform and effective administrative
procedure act in this state.
The standards by which any procedural system should be measured
can readily be stated. The basic purpose of any procedural system
should be to attempt to assure that all matters within its scope are
resolved on their true merits, and not on some failure to follow
exactly the prescribed path. To accomplish this end, there must be
reasonable certainty as to the application of the procedural rules.
The rules themselves must be clearly expressed, readily ascertainable
and must be susceptible of reasonable consistency in their application.
Perfection is not to be expected of any system of administrative
procedure. In Tennessee, however, it is fair to say that there is no
system of administrative procedure, much less an adequate and just
one. Rather, there is a tangled thicket of vague, uncertain, often
conflicting and inconsistent statutes and decisions into which the
hapless litigant proceeds at his peril.
B. Necessity for Motion for New Trial
Illustrative of the inadequacies of the present law of administrative
procedure is City of Whitwell v. Fowler,' where the supreme court
*Member, Clement, Sanford & Fisher, Nashville.
1. 343 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1961).
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dismissed ah appeal on the ground that the appellant had not moved
for a new trial after the decree of the chancery court. The case
arose out of an order of the public service commission regrouping
certain telephone exchanges for rate purposes. The city of Whitwell
and others filed a petition for certiorari to the chancery court, which
dismissed the petition. No motion for a new trial was made. The
supreme court held that in proceeding under the so-called common
law writ of certiorari, 2 the making of a motion for a new trial is a
prerequisite to appeal. The court's decision was probably inevitable
under prior decisions. 3 Motions for new trials in jury cases serve the
useful purpose of clarifying and narrowing the issues on appeal.
However, no useful purpose whatever is served by requiring persons
seeking the review of administrative actions to go through the empty
ritual of moving for a new trial.
C. Scope of Review
In two cases, Blue Ridge Transportation Co. v. Pentecost4 and
Associated Transport, Inc. v. Fowler,5 the court had occasion to
reiterate the rules regarding the scope of review of orders of the
public service commission dealing with the operating rights of motor
carriers. In reviewing such orders, the court is limited to the
questions of whether there is material evidence to support the order,
and whether the order is arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, in
excess of the commission's jurisdiction, or otherwise illegal. On
questions of fact, the court cannot substitute its judgment for the
judgment of the commission.
In the Blue Ridge case, the court considered in some detail whether
the record contained material evidence to support an order of the
commission granting a certificate of convenience and necessity. As
in most such cases, the crucial factor was the public demand or need
for the service proposed. 6 In this regard, the court found material
2. The supreme court has indicated in several opinions that insofar as the
review of orders of administrative agencies is concerned, there is, strictly
speaking, no common law writ. The phrase is used to denote proceedings
under TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-801 (1956), as distinguished from proceedings
under TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-802 (1956). E.g., Hoover Motor Express Co. v.
Railroad & Public Util. Comm'n, 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953).
In proceedings under the former section, the so-called common law writ, the
review is confined to the questions of whether there is any material evidence
to support the agency decision and whether the agency exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally, arbitrarily or fraudulently. In proceedings
under the latter section, the so-called statutory writ, in lieu of appeal, the
review is de novo.
3. E.g., Shelton v. Mooneyhan, 205 Tenn. 425, 326 S.W.2d 825 (1959), where
the same point is considered in detail.
4. 343 S.W.2d 903 (Tenn. 1961).
5. 337 S.W.2d 5 (Tenn. 1960).
6. TENN. CODEANN. § 65-1507(a) (1956).
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evidence in the testimony of a shipper that he had had a survey
made and had a salesman in the area to be served; that if additional
services were authorized, additional facilities would probably be
opened in the area; and that it would be more efficient and economical to utilize the proposed services as compared to existing
services. From the court's opinion, it is not clear to what degree the
witness was specific in his testimony, or to what extent his opinions
were supported by factual statements. Apparently, however, general
statements, opinions and conclusions were deemed sufficient to
constitute material evidence.
In the Blue Ridge case, the service involved was the transportation
of asphalt, asphalt products and "dirty oil." The court stated that
the commission should take judicial knowledge of the accelerated
road program in the state, and indicated that the mere presence of
this program was material evidence supporting the decision of the
commission, even though the commission apparently did not base its
7
decision on this point.
The Blue Ridge case is indicative of the rather extreme limitations
which the supreme court has imposed on the scope of review of
orders of the public service commission. Apparently, any evidence
tending to support the commission's order will be material and thus
sufficient to support the order.
City of Whitwell v. Fowler8 points up the difficulties encountered
in attempting legislative reform in this field. By chapter 162 of the
Public Acts of 1953, 9 an attempt was made to clarify the procedure
before the public service commission by a comprehensive statute
covering the entire field. As originally introduced, the act, among
other things, provided that the court might reverse or remand any decision of the commission if the substantial rights of the petitioner were
prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions of
the commission were "unsupported by substantial evidence in view of
the entire record before the Commission."' 0 This section was
amended, however, to read "unsupported by the preponderance of the
proof in view of the entire record before the commission.""1 In the
Whitwell case, the court quite properly held the provision as enacted
to be "entirely ineffective" as being beyond the province of the courts.
The court did not, however, pass upon the effect of the invalidity of
this clause upon the remainder of the section. It would appear that
7. The court apparently did not consider the statutory limitations on the
commission's power to take notice of judicially cognizable facts. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 65-209(d) (1956).
8. 343 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1961).
9. TENN. CODE AN. §§ 65-201 to -232 (1956).

10. H.B. 914, Gen. Assembly § 29(d) (1953).
11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-229(d) (1956).
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the logical result would be the elision of this clause with the
remainder of the section being applied in conjunction with the
material evidence rule.
As pointed out above, in the Whitwell case the court indicated that
the case was before the courts on the so-called common law writ of
certiorari. The court has never expressly passed upon the effect of
the procedure act for the public service commission 12 in regard to
the availability of the so-called common law writ to review orders of
that commission. The procedure act, unlike sections 9008-16 of the
1932 Code, 13 was obviously intended to cover the entire field of procedure before, and review of the orders of, the public service commission. Unless the judicial review sections of the act are to be held
invalid by virtue of the invalidity of the sub-section discussed above,
it would appear that the so-called common law writ of certiorari is
not properly available to review orders of the public service commission. Nor would the so-called statutory writ be applicable. Rather,
the review would be covered by the provisions of the procedure act.
D. Comparison and Analysis of Statutory Provisions
In its bienniel spawning of new agencies and new regulatory
statutes, the legislature in 1961 followed its customary practice of
giving to each its own pattern of procedure.
Four statutes were adopted dealing with proceedings before the
commissioner of agriculture, a weights and measures act,1 4 a pest
control act, 15 an act regulating the sale of milk and milk products 6

and an act regulating the sale of frozen desserts. 17
The weights and measures act is notably broad in its scope and
detailed in its substantive provisions. Among the more important
procedural provisions of the act are (1) provisions for the issuance
of "stop-use," "stop-removal" and "removal" orders, 8 which are
devices to be used by the commissioner in preventing the use of commodities in violation of the act; (2) a provision for the disposition
of rejected weights and measures; 19 and (3) provisions for the review by the commissioner and by the courts of seizures and confiscations under the act. Apparently no provision was made for the
judicial review of "stop-use" and similar orders, nor for any other
actions of the commissioner except seizures and confiscations. The
12. TENN. CODE AN. §§ 64-201 to -232 (1956).

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Now found in TENN. CODE AN. §§
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 71-201 to -246
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 43-609 to -614
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 52-331 to -334
Tenn. Pub. Acts 1961 ch. 235.

27-901 to -913 (1956).
(Supp. 1961).
(Supp. 1961).
(Supp. 1961).

18. TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-212 (Supp. 1961).
19. TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-221 (Supp. 1961).
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provisions for the review of seizures and confiscations are quite
general and on the whole quite vague. More emphasis is placed on
making certain that unsuccessful petitioners pay for the cost of preparing the transcript than on defining the procedural rights of the
parties. In this, as in several of the other statutes enacted by the
1961 and other recent legislatures, judicial review is "by a petition
for common law writ of certiorari. 2' 0 It is unfortunate that the
legislature has seen fit to codify a misnomer. Another interesting
feature of this act is a prohibition of any judicial action suspending
the orders of the commissioner. 21 The pest control act was amended
extensively, including provisions dealing with the review of license
revocation proceedings. 22 The provisions for hearing before the commissioner and for judicial review are quite similar to those found
in other statutes administered by the commissioner of agriculture.
As in several of the other recent statutes, the provisions for appeal
from the judgment of the circuit court are a possible source of difficulty in construction-any dissatisfied party "may ... appeal to the
Supreme Court and have a re-examination in that Court of the whole
matter of law and fact appearing in the record." This act does contain
one salutary feature: a provision dispensing with a technical bill of
exceptions.
The procedural aspects of the act regulating the sale and distribution of milk and milk products,2 and the act regulating the sale
of frozen desserts 24 are practically identical. The judicial review provisions are similar to those found in the weights and measures act.
As to hearings before the commissioner, the acts provide "such
proceedings shall be informal and the rules of evidence shall not
apply." The provisions governing hearings before the commissioner
on the revocation of a license under these acts differ markedly from
those governing hearings on revocation of a license under the pest
control act; so too do the provisions governing the remedies available
to the commissioner.
One of the most fruitful sources of litigation in the field of administrative law has been the actions of county beer boards in granting
and revoking licenses. The legislature amended the provisions of the
beer board statutes dealing with judicial review to provide that the
review will be "by statutory writ of certiorari, with a trial de novo as
a substitute for an appeal" 2 5-thus making the supreme court the

20. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 71-241 to -242 (Supp. 1961).
21. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 71-243 to -245 (Supp. 1961).
22. TENN. CODE ANN. § 43-614 (Supp. 1961).
23. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 52-331 to -334 (Supp. 1961).

24. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1961 ch. 235.

25. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 57-205 to -209 (Supp. 1961).
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supreme beer board for the State of Tennessee. In view of the oft
repeated statement that the vesting in the courts of the power to
substitute their judgment for that of an administrative agency in
matters not of a judicial nature is unconstitutional, the amendment
will probably be held unconstitutional; at least it will be in so far
as it applies to the granting of beer licenses, since the granting of
beer licenses would not appear to be a judicial function.
Two companion acts in the field of private education offer a striking contrast in their procedural provisions. An act to regulate solicitors for correspondence schools has a scant two paragraphs covering
the procedure for hearings before the commissioner of education and
judicial review thereof.26 An act regulating private business schools
has several sections on the same matter.27 Once again the procedural
aspects of the latter act are in a class by themselves.
In still another act regulating dealers of liquid petroleum gas, no
provision whatever is made for hearings on the granting of licenses,
though the enforcing officer is given discretion in that regard, and no
provision is made for the judicial review of any action of the enforc28
ing officer in granting or revoking licenses or otherwise.
Persons engaged in the business of selling fire arms are now required to be licensed by the commissioner of revenue, who may revoke their licenses "upon good cause" or upon violation of the law.
No provision for hearings before the commissioner is contained in
this act. The action of the commissioner in revoking a permit, but
apparently not in refusing to issue one, is reviewable "in accordance
with the provisions of sections 27-901 through 27-914."29
Boiler and pressure vessel erectors and repairmen were not slighted
except that the statute providing for their licensing contains no procedural provisions at all.30
An act authorizing and regulating dental service plans also contains
its own vague and inadequate procedural provisions. For example,
licenses are subject to revocation "after due notice and right of hearing.",31 Judicial review is "upon a writ of certiorari." Here the
petitioner has thirty days in which to file a petition instead of the ten
given under the pest control act. Perhaps the most interesting feature, however, is that the commissioner of insurance and banking,
who administers the act, is given the authority to adjudicate any
26. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-4001 to -4007 (Supp. 1961).
27. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-3901 to -3924 (Supp. 1961).
28. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 53-3601 to -3609 (Supp. 1961).
29. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4912 (Supp. 1961). An interesting

problem is the

extent to which the code sections referred to in this act are applicable to
other acts which partially cover the same ground.
30. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 53-2714 to -2722 (Supp. 1961).
31. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-3523 (Supp. 1961).
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dispute or controversy between a dental service plan corporation,
32
any participating dentist, or any subscriber.
In none of the acts was any provision made for rule-making procedures, or for challenging the validity or testing the applicability
of rules. Considering the extent of the rule-making powers delegated
by the legislature both in 1961 and in previous years, it is shocking
that so little attention is paid to the procedure for their adoption,
promulgation and application.

II.

SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS

A. Motor CarrierRegulation
Two cases involving the construction of sections of the State Motor
Carrier Act show an interpretive skill on the part of counsel worthy
of a theologian of ancient Alexandria, and further demonstrate the
pressing need for a thorough revision of the act.33 In Associated
Transport,Inc. v. Fowler,34 the court was confronted with the proper
construction of the statute governing the transfer of certificates of
convenience and necessity, which provides in pertinent part that "if
the Commission shall be of the opinion that the purchaser thereof
is in all respects qualified under the provisions of this chapter, to
conduct the business of a motor carrier within the meaning thereof"
then the commission shall transfer the certificate. 35 Over the years,
the commission has construed this sub-secti6n to mean that the issue
in transfer proceedings was whether the transferee was qualified to
conduct the operation, that is, had sufficient equipment, financial
resources, etc., and that the question of the need for the service was
not proper in such proceedings. Nevertheless, the commission has
granted many certificates which the carriers have allowed to become
dormant or "sick." The transfer of such certificates, especially where
they could be joined with other authority to provide new service,
has created a serious question of policy. In the instant case, the
certificates involved apparently were dormant or "sick." The commission, in an effort to meet the question of policy, chose to read into
the phrase "in all respects qualified" not only the qualifications of the
carrier, but also the need for the service, and held that the carrier in
32. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-3529 (Supp. 1961).

33. The basic statute, sections 65-1501 to -1525, was adopted in 1933. Tenn.
Pub. Acts 1933 ch. 119. It is substantially the same as the former act, Tenn.
Code §§ 5471-501 (1932), which in turn was based on Tenn. Pub. Acts 1929
ch. 58. The Tennessee statute antedates the Federal Motor Carrier Act and
the acts of most of the states. In the years since its adoption, there have been
vast changes in the industry and corresponding changes in the needs and
interests to be regulated.
34. 337 S.W.2d 5 (Tenn. 1960).
35. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-1507(d) (1956).
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this instance had not demonstrated its qualifications to provide this
36
service. The supreme court sustained the position of the commission.
Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Pentecost 37 arose out
of an attempt by a motor carrier to utilize the provisions of the late
and unlamented Joe Davis Act 38 to join its certificates so as to be
able to provide through service between Nashville and Chattanooga.
Having been permanently enjoined from providing the service under
its original certificate, the carrier sought to meet the requirements of
the statute by abandoning a part of one of its certificates. The statute
governing such matters 39 provides that no motor carrier shall abandon
or discontinue any service established under the act without an order
of the commission, and further that the commission may for proper
cause revoke, alter or amend any certificate of convenience and
necessity. In this case, the commission, on application of the carrier,
had authorized the abandonment of part of a certificate. The court
held that this could not be done, that while the commission could
authorize the abandonment of all service under the certificate, it
could not authorize the abandonment of the certificate itself. Certificates thus appear to have viability independent of the service which
they authorize.
The legislature amended the Motor Carrier Act to define with more
particularity the exemption therefrom of certain transporters of
petroleum products, 40 and to authorize the public service commission
to appoint "enforcement officers" having broad powers to arrest for
any violations of the act or of orders, decisions, rules or regulations
of the commission.4 1
36. The result in the particular case may well reflect sound policy, but
it would appear that the proper way for the commission to have achieved it
would have been through the adoption of a comprehensive rule under section
65-1507 (c), which gives the commission the power to provide rules governing
certificates of convenience and necessity. AU of which points up the general
and unfortunate tendency of state administrative agencies to neglect their
rule-making powers.
37. 334 S.W.2d 950 (Tenn. 1960). The contrast in the court's approach to
these two cases is of interest. "Both cases turned on questions of statutory
construction. In the Associated Transport case, the court utilized the canon
of not reversing the commission unless its action was arbitrary, and of not
substituting its judgment for that of the commission in sustaining the construction adopted by the commission. In the Tennessee-Carolina case the
court, in striking down the commission's order, used the canon that the commission is a creature of statute and has no power not granted by statute.
38. Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-1508 (1956) repealed by Tenn. Pub. Acts 1959 ch.
248, so called in honor of the carrier for whose benefit it was reputed to have
been enacted.
39. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-1514 (1956).
40. TENN. CODE ANN. §65-1503 (Supp. 1961).
41. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 65-1506 to -1518 (Supp. 1961).
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B. Beer and Whiskey
alcoholic
beverages have provided a source of great
Historically
revenue for governments and the legal profession. There is no indication of any diminution of the supply for either. In Little v. MacFarland42 the court affirmed the revocation of the licenses of certain
retail whiskey dealers on the ground that they had engaged in
business as wholesalers, even though the statute authorizing revocation of such licenses did not specifically make such conduct grounds
for revocation.
In Sparks v. Beer Committee43 the beer committee had, in 1951,
granted a permit to sell beer. In 1958 a church was established
within two thousand feet of the place of business of the beer dealer.
In 1959 a petition was filed with the committee to revoke the permit
of the dealer on the ground that his place of business was within two
thousand feet of a church contrary to the provisions of the controlling
statute. The committee revoked the license, but the court held its
action to be arbitrary and unreasonable.
In Crowley v. De Kalb County Beer Board,44 the court held that
a county beer board had properly denied a permit to sell beer where
neither the petition for the permit nor the evidence had disclosed
where the petitioner proposed to sell beer.
C. Miscellaneous Statutes
The space required precludes a review of the substantive aspects
of the many statutes dealing with regulatory agencies adopted by the
legislature in the 1961 session. Some of the more significant statutes
have been discussed in connection with procedural matters.
42. 337 S.W.2d 233 (Tenn. 1960).

43. 339 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. 1960).
44. 334 S.W.2d 949 (Tenn. 1960).

